


25X9



DOC	18	REV DATE	20/04/82	BY	102877
ORIG COMP	—	CPI	32	TYPE	01
PAGES	30	REV CLASS	C		
JUST	22	NEXT REV	20/2	AUTH:	HR 70-2

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

5. We do not agree with the Director of Personnel's memorandum to the Executive Director of 14 January 1964, "Applicant Cases Cancelled After Full Clearance" in which he concludes that there is no effective solution to the cancellation problem except to press the interested offices to make more frequent review of cases in process. We believe that a careful analysis of the October 1963 cases in which the requesting offices cancelled after full clearance would seem to indicate several problems: several applicants apparently were not qualified for the jobs for which they were recruited; three applicants made poor impressions which they should also have made on recruiters or interviewers; ceiling limitations which could have been anticipated much earlier by requesting offices were given as the reasons for cancelling five cases; one JOT candidate was obviously unqualified, had poor test scores and was not even acceptable to RID apparently. We believe that a general tightening of recruitment and interviewing standards, as well as an attack on sloppy personnel forecasts and monitoring by requesting offices are both in order.

6. It is difficult to compute the costs of processing people who do not finally EOD, but we estimate that they are at least as high as the costs of processing the EODs. This means that CIA really spent about [REDACTED] for FY-1963 and about [REDACTED] in the first six months of FY-1964 in getting new personnel.

25X1A

25X1A

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

7. The Office of Personnel and other DDS components have long recognized the high costs of processing new employees and have attempted to reduce them when possible. They have streamlined security investigations, medical examinations, testing, personnel processing, where possible. They are looking into other pre-screening possibilities. They are trying to tighten monitoring procedures. The additional action required to reduce these costs is primarily outside the Office of Personnel, the Office of Security and the Medical Staff, and lies with the four Deputy Directorates and the Office of the DCI. More attention must be given by these offices to the costs of recruiting new personnel, to reducing attrition where possible, to refining forecasts of personnel requirements and monitoring cases in process.

Attrition

8. Although CIA's attrition is apparently less than the federal service generally, CIA lost 715 "professionals" in FY-1963 and 312 in the first six months of FY-1964. There are no statistics in the federal service against which CIA may be compared on such personnel. CIA lost 806 clericals in FY-1963 and 512 in the first six months of FY-1964. CIA's clerical attrition has been [REDACTED] for the past two years. Again, 25X1A there are no overall government statistics for clerical attrition, and 25X1A CIA may be no worse than other agencies. But if DDI loses more than 1

[REDACTED]

this represents a sizeable cost which CIA should

try to reduce.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -


9. We understand that the Office of Research and Reports has lost an average of 5 economists a month for several years, for reasons which are not clear. There is also high attrition in the Office of Current Research, the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Basic Intelligence, for several reasons. There is high turnover among analysts of the Records Integration Division (RID) of the Clandestine Services because the work is routine and the personnel deliberately over-qualified for the job. RID is used to some extent as a sort of staging area for the JOT program and for CS Area Divisions. (The expansion of the JOT program may make it advisable to review this policy of RID). The Plans and Review Staff of the Office of Personnel should examine in depth the reasons for attrition in these and other areas where it seems out of line, and see what can be done about it. ✓
planned
internal
attrition

10. The Office of Personnel in 1963 initiated a pilot program, "the gray lady program" - in which 23 women 35 to 50, living in the Washington, D.C. area were recruited for selected clerical jobs. We are told that experience to date indicates that these women perform at least as well as younger women, and are likely to remain with CIA longer than the two year average of young women in their late teens and early twenties who comprise the majority of CIA's clericals. A spot check of exit processing records indicates that these young women leave to get married, return home for personal reasons, have children, because of a transfer of their husband to another area - not very surprising reasons. A few leave because of a job-connected problem, but these are a small percentage. ?

 T

- 5 -

11. If the experience with the "gray ladies" holds up, we believe this program should be expanded into those areas of CIA where clerical mobility overseas is not a factor. This will not be a major solution to clerical attrition but it will help. A study of other possible ways of recruiting clericals who can perform effectively and who will stay longer should be made by the Plans and Review Staff. A&E Staff data on the kinds of people who can perform monotonous clerical jobs should be taken into consideration.



~~SECRET~~

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a. The Executive Director-Comptroller forcibly bring to the attention of all concerned the high costs of attrition and recruiting new personnel in CIA and the need for attacking this problem as a matter of some priority.

b. The Director of Personnel, in collaboration with the four Deputy Directorates and the Office of the DCI, examine in depth the reasons for high attrition in some offices and possible ways of reducing it. This should include a close examination of the character of the work, qualifications for the job and personnel management practices in those areas where attrition is high.

c. The Director of Personnel re-examine the present procedures for forecasting personnel requirements and monitoring cases in process, including security clearances, with a view to reducing the unacceptably large number of people who are fully cleared and yet do not enter on duty.

~~SECRET~~